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Abstract
We examine the impact of seller’s Property Condition Disclosure Law on the
residential real estate values. A disclosure law may address the information asym-
metry in housing transactions shifting of risk from buyers and brokers to the sell-
ers and raising housing prices as a result. We combine propensity score tech-
niques from the treatment effects literature with a traditional event study approach.
We assemble a unique set of economic and institutional attributes for a quarterly
panel of 291 US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and 50 US States span-
ning 21 years from 1984 to 2004 is used to exploit the MSA level variation in
house prices. The study finds that the average seller may be able to fetch a higher
price (about three to four percent) for the house if she furnishes a state-mandated
seller.s property condition disclosure statement to the buyer. When we compare
the results from parametric and semi-parametric event analyses, we find that the
semi-parametric or the propensity score analysis generals moderately larger esti-
mated effects of the law on housing prices.
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It is well understood that resale markets with asymmetric information create a lemon’s problem 
where owners have an incentive to keep products with above average quality on factors that are 
unobservable in the market and to sell products that have below average quality (Akerloff, 1970).  
Used automobile markets (Offer, 2007; Bond, 2002), resale of aircraft (Gilligan, 2004), owner-
occupied housing markets, and even the market for securitized debt might suffer from this 
lemon’s problem (Van Order, 2006; Glaeser and Kallal, 1997).  A possible solution to this 
problem is government imposed seller disclosure and seller liability for known, undisclosed 
defects, which provides redress to buyers once they have taken possession of the property and 
have the opportunity to obtain private information concerning product quality (Fishman and 
Hagerty, 2003).1   
 
The application of this solution to residential property markets was brought to public attention by 
the path-breaking 1984 California appellate court verdict, which made the case for requiring a 
seller's disclosure statement in residential real estate transactions.2  Since that time, 34 state 
governments or courts have imposed seller disclosure requirements on the market  for residential 
property.  Several studies have documented the rationale and effect of seller disclosure laws 
including Zumpano and Johnson (2003) who find based on insurance claims that 76% of all suits 
against real estate salespeople involve the condition of the property, Nanda (2008) who finds a 
link between the number of disciplinary actions of against real estate agents and the adoption of 
disclosure laws, and finally Moore and Smolen (2000) who find that customer dissatisfaction 
dropped with the adoption of such laws.3 
 
                                                 
1
 Anti-lemon laws in the automobile industry provide an example of an alternative approach for addressing 
this problem (Shaffer and Ostas, 2001). 
2
 Easton v. Strassburger (152 Cal.App.3d 90, 1984) was a California Appellate Court decision that 
expanded the duty of realtors and the grounds for realtor negligence in selling faulty homes. 
3
 See Lefco (2004) for a detailed discussion of the implementation of seller disclosure laws, and Pancak, 
Miceli, and Sirmans (1996) for a discussion of real estate broker incentives concerning the adoption of 
seller disclosure laws. 
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This paper examines whether the adoption of seller disclosure laws over the last two decades has 
reduced the magnitude of the asymmetric information problem in residential property markets. 
Following Akerlof’s (1970) ‘lemons’ paper, the average selling price of homes is reduced by the 
presence of asymmetric information as buyers adapt to the expectation that higher quality homes 
will be held off the market.  If seller disclosure laws reduce the asymmetric information problem, 
housing prices should rise in response leading to an ‘abnormal return’ on real estate following the 
adoption of such laws.  Accordingly, we treat the adoption of seller disclosure laws as an ‘event’ 
and test whether ‘abnormal returns’ can be detected following state adoption. 
 
Specifically, this paper conducts both a traditional event study and a modified propensity score 
analysis to examine whether the adoption of seller disclosure laws creates temporary abnormal 
returns as prices adjust in response to a reduction in the lemons problem in the sale of owner-
occupied housing.  The event study methodology assumes that the market is efficient in 
assimilating new information and can detect the extent of re-pricing due to the event by 
examining whether returns on assets are unusually high immediately following the event, an 
“abnormal return”. Since Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), a myriad of papers in finance 
have applied the event study methodology including recent applications such as the effect of coal 
industry cartels (Bittner, 2005), the Japanese banking crisis (Miyajima and Yafeh, 2007), and the 
effect of corporate spin-off announcements (Veld and Veld, In Press). More specifically, in real 
estate, Brau and Holmes (2006) examine the effect of stock repurchase announcements by Real 
Estate Investment Trusts, and Fuerst (2005) examines the effect of the 9/11 attacks on the New 
York office market.  
 
Event studies are most commonly applied in contexts where a market index provides a 
benchmark for comparing the returns from the assets that have been affected by an event.  In 
cases where the affected assets are a large share of the market, however, a reasonable alternative 
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is to use returns for the segment of the market that is unaffected by the event as a benchmark.  
This alternative benchmark illustrates the similarity between event studies and the standard 
treatment effects literature typically found in labor economics (Heckman and Hotz, 1989).  A 
common concern in the treatment effects literature is systematic selection of individuals into 
either the treatment or control group, and in this literature propensity score models provide a 
standard solution for bias caused by a complex, non-linear process of selection on observables 
(Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997 and 1998; Smith and Todd, 
2000).  Naturally, in the context of an event study, the traditional propensity score approach must 
be modified to allow for across time variation in the likelihood of the event. 
 
Specifically, this paper examines whether the adoption of property disclosure laws leads to an 
increased rate of housing appreciation using a quarterly panel of housing price indices from the 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) for 291 US Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSAs) and 50 US States spanning 21 years from 1984 to 2004.  The impact of law 
adoption is estimated using both a standard event study based on traditional parametric panel data 
models, as well as semi-parametric propensity score matching model that is adapted to an event 
study framework by using a proportional hazard model of event occurrence or law adoption as the 
link function rather than a standard binary choice model of receipt of treatment.  We find a robust 
positive effect of the seller’s Property Condition Disclosure Law on property values especially for 
the propensity score model.  The results suggest that the average seller may be able to fetch a 
higher price (about three to four percent) for the house if she furnishes a state-mandated seller’s 
Property Condition Disclosure statement to the buyer. 
 
Rest of the study proceeds as follows Section 2 discusses the parametric panel estimation 
methods, the semi-parametric propensity score approach, and finally the standard event study. 
Section 3 provides the description of the economic and institutional variables, Section 4 analyzes, 
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compares, and contrasts the results from different econometric models, and finally, we conclude 
in Section 5. 
 
2 Methodology 
 
At the onset of an empirical analysis of the impact of a law adoption, we face the choice between 
treating adoption as a one-time shock to the housing market or a shock that persists over several 
years.  Unlike a disclosure that describes past financial outcomes, the adoption of a law may be 
followed by a period of uncertainty where individuals learn about the impact of the law over time, 
and the total impact of the law on asset prices may not be realized for several years.  For example, 
rational buyers and sellers might gradually learn about the effectiveness of the law in bringing 
about the desired transparency in property transactions over time gaining confidence in the 
quality of the resulting housing units on the market (buyers) and in the fairness of prices obtained 
for housing units marketed with full disclosure. Figure (1) provides a diagrammatic exposition on 
the slow adjustment (dotted line in the figure) in buyers’ perception of the effectiveness of the 
disclosure law. In order to test the length of the slow adjustment empirically, we use 
specifications with different lengths or windows for duration of the shock or the period of 
“abnormal returns”. 
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Figure 1 Movement of Housing Price Index at the level 
 
 
2.1 Parametric Approaches to Ascertain the Effect on Property Values 
We start with typical event study using traditional panel data procedures. Our model in equation 1 
uses index i for MSA, j for state, t for quarter-year.  The terms ωt and σi capture the quarter-year 
fixed effect and the MSA fixed effect, respectively. The dependent variable is the percentage 
change in Yit where Yit is the Housing Price Index (HPI); Xit is a vector of economic 
characteristics of the MSA; Zjt is a vector of economic and institutional characteristics of the 
state; ε it is the error term, and Sjt is a binary variable that is one if the law has been adopted 
immediately preceding period t so that (Sjt - Sjt-s) takes on a value of 1 for s years (our event 
window) immediately following the adoption of the law.4 
                                                 
4
 The economic controls are standard in the literature on housing price volatility, see Miller and Peng 
(2005).  We include the state-level institutional characteristics to control for the fact that such variables 
might be correlated with both law adoption and unobservables that correlate with housing price 
appreciation, but naturally we do not expect these controls to have a causal effect on housing prices. 
 
HPI 
Level 
Time t   t+1  t-2 t-1   t+3  t+2   t-3     t-4   t+4 
Slow Adjustment of the Buyers’ Perception
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In this model, the quarter-year fixed effects capture housing price appreciation over time and act 
as the market benchmark for the event study.  The parameter 
δ
 captures quarter-by-quarter 
whether housing price appreciation during a metropolitan area’s event window differs 
systematically from housing price appreciation during other periods.  This specification acts as an 
event study with or without the MSA fixed effects.  However, the MSA fixed effects assure that 
models are identified based on difference in appreciation rates within an MSA after controlling 
for national housing appreciation rates in that quarter.  As such, the model controls for observable 
and unobservable time-invariant differences across states that might influence both the likelihood 
of ever adopting the law and metropolitan specific housing price appreciation rates. 
 
While standard errors are robust to serial correlation, the specif ication in equation (1) does not 
impose any specific assumptions about serial correlation in error structure, and in the current 
context, the unobservables especially those related to institutional structure may persist over time.  
Accordingly, we consider alternative GLS specification in which we eliminate MSA fixed effects 
via first differencing and allow the first difference error structure to fol low the following possible 
patterns:  no autocorrelation, same AR(1) across MSA’s, and MSA-specific AR(1).  
 
2.2 Semi-Parametric Approaches to Ascertain the Effect on Property Values 
Propensity score matching method developed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) provides a 
competing approach to analyze the effect of a treatment (in our case, adoption of disclosure law) 
on an outcome variable (i.e. percentage change in HPI). Propensity score methods have been 
extensively applied in program evaluation literature within labor economics (Dehejia and Wahba, 
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1999; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997 and 1998; Smith and Todd, 2000). The reasons why 
we use the propensity score approach to compare and contrast with the parametric estimation 
methods are three-fold, also noted in Slottje et al. (2005): (1) the propensity score approach 
imposes fewer assumptions about the distribution of the data, it permits non-parametric 
interactions among all the covariates in determining the outcome (i.e. selection on observables), it 
ascertains the mean impact of treatment on the treated within a group of ‘very similar’ units. As 
opposed to parametric approaches that consider all the units to infer an effect size. 
 
The motivation of propensity score matching methods can be summarized as follows: In 
observational studies, the units are assigned to treatment and control groups in a highly non-linear 
manner. Therefore, even in models that include parametric controls for all variables that influence 
selection, treatment effect estimates will be biased by the unknown, non-linear selection process. 
Propensity score matching is based on the idea that the bias is reduced when the comparison of 
mean impact is performed using treated and control units, which are similar on the observables 
that influence selection. The propensity score acts as an index on which the matching can be 
performed since it is generally not feasible to match on an n-dimensional vector of characteristics 
(Becker and Ichino, 2002). More formally, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) define the propensity 
score as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given a vector of pre-treatment 
characteristics: 
[ ]jijj ZSESZP |]1Pr[)( ==≡              (2)  
where Sj = {0, 1} is the treatment dummy, and Xj is a vector of pre-treatment  attributes.   
 
Our parameter of interest is the mean effect of treatment (MET) on the treated units defined as:5 
                                                 
5
 See Todd (1999) for a discussion on this and other matching estimators. 
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where yj is the outcome of interest and the expected value of yj for Sj=0 is estimated based on yk 
for k’s that have the same likelihood of treatment as k and for which Sk=0.   
 
As described in Becker and Ichino (2002), the first step in obtaining estimates of treatment effects 
using a propensity score model is to estimate the likelihood of treatment and predict the 
likelihood of treatment for each observation typically using a standard discrete choice model like 
the Logit or Probit often referred to as the link function. However, in our context, the property 
condition disclosure law is adopted by different states at different points in time with events (law 
adoptions) occurring at various times rather than simply a single treatment. The probability for 
law adoption varies across states as well as time i.e. a disparate treatment exists. The fundamental 
assumption in logit and probit models that the probability approaches zero and one at the same 
rate is not tenable since the law has been adopted by different states in different time. According 
to Clarke, Courchane, and Roy (2005), use of a symmetric link function (i.e. inverse of the 
cumulative distribution function) like logit or probit would extend bias when such disparate 
treatment exists and is not capable of capturing the variations over time. A good alternative for 
our problem is the complimentary log-log model that incorporates an asymmetric link function.6   
{comment - Please eliminate the use of the word disparate treatment – it is confusing Jargon and 
no one will no what you are talking about} 
                                                 
6
 The hazard function can be represented by a standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
ββββ jjjj wwPwPwPit ′=−= ))];(1/();(log[));((log 111       
In equation (5), the underlying assumption is that the probability );(1 βjwP  approaches zero and one at 
the same rate i.e. the link is symmetric. However, as explained before, a disparate treatment exists. An 
alternative is complimentary log-log or the proportional hazard link function, which is: 
ββ jj wwP ′=−−− )));(1log(log( 1  or, ))exp(exp(1);(1 ββ jj wwP ′−−= with 
);(1 βjwP approaching one faster than zero. See Clarke, Courchane, and Roy (2005). 
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Specifically, we will adopt discrete time proportional hazard model as our link function7 and 
estimate the likelihood of law adoption using the following model (Kiefer, 1988; de Figueiredo 
and Vanden Bergh, 2004)  
)exp()()( 0 jtj Ztt γλλ =                  (4) 
where λ i(t) represents the hazard of law adoption for a state that has not yet adopted the law and 
the probability of a state adopting the law in one period conditional on not having adopted it 
previously is 
[ ]jtjtjtjtjtjt ZSSESZS γγ |]0,|1Pr[ 11 −− −===             (5) 
The estimated probability of a given quarter-year t being in state j’s event window is simply 
∑
=
−+−+−+−−−− ===−
s
u
usjtusjtusjtsjtjtjtsjtjt SZSZZZSSE
1
11 ]0,|1Pr[]ˆ,...,ˆ,ˆ|[ γγγγ         (6) 
which is used as the propensity score for every quarter-year in each state or in the MSA’s for each 
the state. 
 
We employ a Kernel Matching method where each treatment observation or MSA-quarter year is 
matched with a weighted average of all control units where weights are calculated as inverse of 
the Euclidean distance between the propensity scores of the two units.8  The Kernal Matching 
method efficiently uses all information to form a control or benchmark for each treatment 
observation, which is important when some treatment observations have few control or 
comparison observations with similar propensity scores.  Finally, we verify that for each 
treatment observation the weighted average of the observed state attributes Xjt for control 
                                                 
7
 Obviously, many complex extensions exist to the traditional proportional Hazard model.  However, 
propensity score estimation is very robust to misspecification in the link function and so is typically 
conducted with very simple link functions such as the proportional hazard model in our case and logit or 
probit in traditional applications (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). 
8
 Traditionally, the score is used to divide the sample into equally spaced intervals or bins, and within each 
bin a test is conducted for whether the average propensity score of treated and control units do not differ 
statistically. If it differs, the interval split again until the condition is satisfied.  With Kernel Matching all 
treated are matched with a weighted average of all controls with weights that are inversely proportional to 
the distance between the propensity scores of treated and controls. 
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observations does not differ statistically observation from the state attributes for the treatment 
observation. The estimation is carried out in the common support region. Common support 
refers to overlapping distributions of their characteristics. The major advantage of 
propensity score approaches compared to traditional regression-based methods is that 
regression hides the common support problem, because it does not quantify the 
similarities (or dissimilarities) between the two groups. 
 
Finally, we calculate the average difference between outcomes (i.e. percentage change in HPI) of 
the treatment/event window MSA-quarter years and the weighted average of control quarter year 
HPI as described in equation (3). 
 
2.3 Adapting the Event Study Methodology 
 
An event study aims to estimate the “abnormal return” that occurs during an event window that 
immediately follows the event - the difference between the expected price of an asset based on 
benchmark appreciation rates following the event and the observed price in the end of the event  
window. The following scheme outlines the modified event study procedure: 
 
Event:                            Adoption of the property condition disclosure law 
Outcome Variable:       quarterly HPI growth rate 
Event Window:             16 quarters before and 16 quarters after the adoption of the law.  
Sample:                         MSAs in 50 US states – 34 states adopted the law. 
Notations:                     Event time = 0;  
                                      Pre-event time periods = -1,…, -16; Post-event time periods = +1,…, +16                               
                                      HPI growth rate for treated MSA= hT                
                                      HPI growth rate for control MSA= hC 
                                      Abnormal Return = AR                 
                                      Cumulative Abnormal Return = CAR 
                                      MSAs = k;       Treated MSAs = i;    Control MSAs = j;     i ,j ∈ k 
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Event Time-line: 
                   ---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|----------|---------|---------|----------- 
                             -16      -12         -8         -4           0         +4           +8          +12       +16 
  
Step-1:   Estimating Propensity Score Model using equation (6). The estimated propensity score                 
is obtained for each MSA in each quarter-year. 
 
Step-2:   For each treated MSA in respective event date, we find the closest match from the                
group of control MSAs in terms of the estimated propensity score. So, the HPI growth                
rate of matched control MSA would be the benchmark from which we calculate the                
deviations of the actual return or HPI growth rate of the treated MSA for each time               
period in the event window.  
 
Step-3:   Calculating the Abnormal Returns (AR): For a given treated MSA, i, and a matched 
control MSA, j, we obtain: 
               
( )CjTii hhAR 16,16,16 −−− −=  
                   . 
               
( )CjTii hhAR 0,0,0 −=  
                   . 
               
( )CjTii hhAR 16,16,16 +++ −=                                                                                                 
We calculate the average (across treated MSAs) abnormal returns for each event date. 
 
Step-4:    Calculation of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR): It is calculated as the cumulative 
aggregation of the average ARs. For example, for a three period CAR (i.e. within one period of 
the event date), we obtain - [ ]101 +− ++= iii ARARARCAR . 
 
3 Data Description  
The study uses information on economic variables and institutional variables for 291 MSAs in 50 
US States from 1984 to 2004. For the MSA level analysis, we utilize the quarterly information i.e. 
24,444 observations. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has changed the definition of 
MSAs a few times during the study period. Since, OFHEO uses 2003 MSA definition to compute 
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the housing price index; we use 2003 MSA definition for our analysis. Since, our treatment 
variable is the adoption of disclosure law, which is state-mandated, we discard the MSAs, which 
cross the state boundaries, and we discard the consolidated MSAs.  
 
To our knowledge, 34 states have already mandated some form of disclosure statement. We 
obtained the effective dates of the mandate from official statements for each state.9 To estimate 
the housing price changes, we use the repeat sales quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI), reported 
by the OFHEO. We use quarterly percentage change in HPI in MSA level analysis. For yearly 
analysis, we take the average quarterly rate of change for the year. This is the case with the 
propensity score matching analyses. One important advantage of the time period is that on 
average, we can observe the treated units sufficiently before and after the adoption of the 
disclosure law for most of the states. In our sample, California, being the first state, adopted the 
law in 1987, while the majority of other 33 states adopted the law in 1990s. 
 
3.1 Economic Variables: 
We use labor market characteristics like the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate and the job 
growth rate, which are provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In order to comply with 
2003 MSA definition, we use county labor market information to aggregate up to the MSA level. 
Other economic variables include percentage change in per capita income, percentage change in 
per capita Gross State Product (GSP), and the population growth rate, which are obtained from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We also include single-family 30-year average 
mortgage rates for states. Per capita Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP) data is not publicly 
available. We compute MSA share of GSP to use it as a proxy for GMP10. United States 
Conference of Mayors and the National Association of Counties publish GMP data from 1997. 
                                                 
9
 Pancak et al. (1996) lists the states, which adopted the disclosure law until 1996. 
10
 Proxy GMP=GSP*(MSA population/State population). 
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Comparing with the United States Conference of Mayors and the National Association of 
Counties’ GMP data, we find that our proxy is close to the official estimates. Moreover, we are 
interested in the variation in per capita GMP. The economic variables with the exception of the 
labor market controls are available on a yearly basis. We interpolate these variables to the 
quarterly level11. Broadly, these variables characterize the economic make-up of each 
metropolitan area. 
 
3.2 Institutional Variables: 
Numerous lawsuits against the real estate licensees made the case for adoption of disclosure laws. 
Presumably the legal activities are influenced by the institutional characteristics of the state. 
Statistics from the Digest of Real Estate Licensing Laws and Current Issues (reports from 1985 to 
2005) compiled by the Association of Real Estate Licensing Law Officials (ARELLO) provide a 
rich set of characteristics that are closely associated with the institutional backdrop of the 
disclosure law. For example, the number of complaints against real estate licensees indicates the 
level of dissatisfaction with licensee provided service. Similarly, the number of disciplinary 
actions taken against the licensees provides information about how the monitoring authority 
performs its duty.12 Other institutional controls include number of active brokers, associate 
brokers, and salespersons in each state and the broker supervision. In fact, it was the concerted 
                                                 
11
 Since linear interpolation takes two yearly values and fits a straight line while projecting the 
data in between, it is generally less accurate than other polynomial based methods. So, we apply a 
cubic spline interpolation method, which uses the data point value along with the first and the 
second derivatives at each surrounding point to interpolate. When we compare the results with 
interpolated quarterly data with the actual yearly data, the qualitative results do not differ.  
 
12
 When disciplinary actions figure is missing or zero, we take the average of the figures within 1-
year range. When total disciplinary actions figure is missing in ARELLO reports, if available, we 
take the sum of the figures under different categories of disciplinary actions, or, we take the sum 
of the actions by consent and number of formal hearing as total number of disciplinary actions 
(this is the case until 1986). Then we take sum of disciplinary action and formal hearing from 
column of complaints resulting in some actions. Both of these are expected to provide the number 
of complaints having enough substance to attract legal attention. This is typically the case with 
Arizona and Hawaii for 1984 to 1986. 
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movement and lobbying on the part of realtor’s association, which moved law onto the agenda of 
in many state legislatures. In order to control for the organization of real estate agents in different 
states, we include the number of active brokers, associate brokers, and salespersons in each state 
in our analysis.13 We also include a measure of the extent of broker supervision in our analysis. 
Pancak and Sirmans (2005) expect that “greater supervision would prevent intentional and 
unintentional wrong doing on the part of salespersons, and therefore decrease findings of 
misconduct”. These variables broadly characterize the institutional make-up of the real estate 
market.  
 We also include a control for partisan control in the state legislation. Following de 
Figueiredo and Vanden Bergh (2004), we include an indicator variable for democratic and 
republican control. In order to fully exploit the information on political make-up of the state 
general assembly, we use detailed partisan control variables rather than a simple blue/red 
category. We used indicator variables capturing Democratic-Control-Republican-Governor, 
Democratic-Control-Democratic-Governor, Republican-Control-Republican-Governor, 
Republican-Control-Democratic-Governor. The information on partisan control for each general 
election cycle is obtained from National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). 
 
Table (1) reports the summary statistics of the above controls for the treated and the control units. 
A few important observations can be made based on the summary statistics. Both at the MSA 
level as well as the state level, average percentage change in HPI is slightly higher (1.13 percent 
against 1.01 percent for MSAs, and 1.22 percent against 1.06 percent for States) for the treated 
group than for the control group. Unemployment rate and other economic controls are generally 
higher for the control units. Remarkably, average number of disciplinary actions (about 134 
against 51) and average number of complaints (about 860 against 737) are higher for the states, 
                                                 
13
 Ideally, the percentage of licensees who are associated with some trade organizations like National 
Association of Realtors (NAR) could serve as an excellent indicator of the lobbying effort. However, it is 
hard to obtain this information across the states for the long time series required for this study. 
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which adopted disclosure law, but this may arise in part from high levels preceding adoption. 
Generally, the higher number of disciplinary actions and complaints against the licensees in 
treatment states suggest that these controls are important in capturing the dissatisfaction of the 
consumers, and also due to high volume of complaints, regulators might be inclined to a state-
mandated disclosure requirement. On average, control units tend to have greater broker 
supervision (51 percent against 48 percent) than the treated units. This supports the hypothesis 
that greater broker supervision ensures less mistakes and greater awareness of the market 
practices among salespersons, which, in turn, tend to reduce the dissatisfaction among the 
homeowners. The disclosure states tend to have higher number of active licensees. Interestingly, 
the treated states are more likely to be under republican control than under democratic control, 
but this may result from the important role of the industry in lobbying for seller disclosure laws as 
opposed to traditional consumer protection groups.  
 
4 Empirical Results 
We discussed the slow adjustment process of the legal shock in the section (2). To get a sense of 
the “speed” of the adjustment process we use equation (1) i.e. the regression model that allows for 
MSA and time effects, and specify the length of legal dummy to be single quarter, four quarters, 
eight quarters and, up to thirty-six quarters or nine years. We try two ways to test the robustness 
of the outcome. First, we keep the sample size same for all the lengths limiting our sample to 
states that adopted the law at least nine years prior to the end of our sample period. Next, we 
adjust the sample size as we increase the length so that shorter event windows allow the inclusion 
of states that adopted the law closer to the end of our sample. In figure (2), we plot the estimates 
on legal dummy variable from different specifications in terms of lengths of law adjustment.  
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Figure 2 Plot of the Estimates 
The analysis reveals significant effects when we assume long-term persistence in the shock. The 
effect is most pronounced in 4 to 6 years of windows. This is quite consistent with the theoretical 
hypothesis in figure (1). Figure (2) appears to suggest that the estimate is almost zero when we 
specify the length as 8 to 9 years, however, figure 2 is based on quarterly appreciation rates. In 
order to get the actual effect size of the event, we need to multiply the estimates in figure 2 with 
the corresponding number of quarters that we specify as the event window.  
 
Figure 3 Plot of the Actual Effect Sizes 
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For example, in figure (2), the effect is about 0.167 per quarter for the model with 4 years (or 16 
quarters) of length of persistence where we use the adjusted sample. Therefore, the actual effect is 
2.67 (= 0.167*16). We plot the actual effect size in figure (3). Figure (3) reveals that the effect 
size decreases gradually and is not zero in 8 to 9 years of adjustment lengths. It suggests that the 
effect of the law on property values is generally spread over about four to six years. Therefore, 
we treat the adoption of the law as an event that creates “abnormal returns” for four years 
following the event.14 
 
4.1 Parametric Results 
Results for equations (1) are reported in table (2) for the MSA level analysis. Column (1) reports 
estimates that only control for quarter-year fixed effects while columns (2) and (3) report the 
estimates after including state and MSA fixed effects respectively. The estimated impact of law 
adoption is fairly stable across the three models.  The estimate of 0.167 differential appreciation 
rates from column (3) is the figure used in figure (2) for an event window of 4 years.  Multiplying 
this effect by 16 quarters yields a 2.67 (= 0.167*16) percent increase in asset values during the 
event window relative to the market benchmark.  
 
Results from feasible GLS procedure are reported in table (3). As discussed before, feasible GLS 
procedure provides improvement (in terms of efficiency gain) over pooled regressions when we 
specify the error structure. The estimated effect size in table (3) column (3) is nearly identical to 
the 2.67 percent increase in asset values from column (3) in Table (2).  
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Similar results are obtained using a six year event window. 
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4.2 Propensity Score Estimates 
Propensity scores are obtained from a proportional hazard model with economic and institutional 
variables as described in Nanda (2008). Virtually all our data is annual so that there is almost no 
variation in propensity scores across quarters.  Therefore, this analysis is done with yearly data at 
the MSA level i.e. information about 291 MSAs for 21 years although annual appreciation rates 
are divided by four to be comparable to quarterly rates used in Tables (2) and (3) 15. We look at 
the effects with three different estimators: (1) a simple average difference in percentage change in 
HPI that does not control for cross-section and time effects; (2) an average difference in 
percentage change in HPI after controlling for the year effect; and (3) a differences in differences 
estimate based on removing year and MSA fixed effects.  Estimator (1) is simply the difference in 
Average HPI rate between the treatment and control groups, state quarter-years that fall in or 
outside of each states event window. Estimator (2) is obtained from estimator (1) after controlling 
for the year effect so that the outcome variable is a quarter-year’s deviation from average 
appreciation in that quarter-year across the entire sample. Estimator (3) is defined as difference 
between average HPI deviation for a quarter year (after controlling for year affects) between 
treated and control groups compared to the difference between the treated and control groups’ 
average HPI deviation from a year before the disclosure law was adopted, where the year before 
adoption provides a market benchmark. Since there are some MSAs, which have missing values 
on the HPI in early years of the sample period, we use earliest available HPI rate as the 
benchmark. However, we make sure that the benchmark is from a year prior to adoption of the 
disclosure law. This leaves us with 286 MSAs for the analysis. 
 
                                                 
15
 While conducting the yearly analysis, we test alternative specifications for the timing of the law 
adoption. Since we know the effective day of the mandate, we could assign the corresponding 
year as the adoption year. However, one could argue that if the effective date falls in last two 
quarters of the year, bulk of home sales has already taken place. Therefore, the effectiveness of 
the mandate really starts from next year. We tried both the specifications. The qualitative and 
quantitative results are robust to this concern. 
 20
Table (4) reveals the results from semi-parametric propensity score matching analysis with kernel 
matching.  The estimated effect size falls between 1.59 and 3.50 percent.  Column (3) of table (4) 
reveals about 3.50 percent (i.e. 0.219*16= 3.50, for 16 quarters) significant and positive effect at 
the MSA level, which is higher than 2.67 percent that we found in column (3) of tables (2) and 
(3).   The first column does not involve any controls for differentials in the national rates of 
housing price appreciation during periods shortly after the adoption of laws in many states and 
other periods of time.  Therefore, in our view, the results in columns (2) and (3) which fall 
between 3.30 and 3.50 percent are our best estimates that are most directly comparable to the 
parametric estimates in Table (2). 
 
4.3 Analysis of Abnormal Returns  
In the propensity score matching estimation, the control unit may come from any of the periods in 
the sample. However, it may be desirable to find a matched control from the disclosure year or 
from the vicinity of that time period. To address this concern, we restrict the control unit to be 
obtained within one year of the law adoption. This is done in an event study approach as laid out 
in section (2.3). The abnormal returns or ARs are obtained as the deviation of the treatment unit’s 
HPI growth rate from the control unit’s HPI growth rate at each event dates, which are lined up as 
different states adopted the law at different dates. The control units are obtained by matching on 
the estimated propensity scores. We apply the restriction of obtaining matches within one year of 
the event date. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated as the sample average cumulative 
abnormal return for 16th quarter to the specified quarter.  
 
Table (5) reports the results from an event study analysis at the MSA level. We calculate the 
cumulative abnormal returns for 33 quarters i.e. 16 quarters before and after the event date. The 
analysis suggests about 2.6 percent increase in house prices due to adoption of the Property 
Condition Disclosure Law. On average, the event date abnormal return is positive. Almost 50 
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percent of the abnormal return estimates are positive on the event date and on other dates in the 
event window. The percentage of positive abnormal returns is slightly higher in the post-event 
time periods than in the pre-event dates.  
 
 
Figure 4 Plot of Cumulative Abnormal Return for Adoption of Disclosure Law 
 
The plot of CARs in figure (4) reveals that the effect of the law increases gradually in the event 
window and supports the hypothesis that the initial skepticism about the effectiveness of the law 
gradually goes away and the buyers offer higher bid prices for the houses disclosed to be in good 
condition. 
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5 Conclusion 
The study examines the impacts of seller's Property Condition Disclosure mandate on the 
residential real estate values. We analyze the effect of information transparency and the shift of 
risk from buyers and brokers to the sellers due to adoption of the law on property values. The 
analytical structure employs parametric panel data models, semi-parametric propensity score 
matching models, and an event study framework using a rich set of economic and institutional 
variables for a quarterly panel of 291 US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and a yearly 
panel of 50 US States spanning 21 years from 1984 to 2004 to address the research question.  
 
Analyzing the MSA level variation in Housing Price Indices, we find a positive effect of the 
seller’s Property Condition Disclosure Law on property values, and the effect is spread over 
about four years. We suggest using semi-parametric approaches due to absence of any a priori 
distributional assumption, and comparison based on similar units. Moreover, we show that 
compared to parametric event study, the propensity score effects are somewhat larger in size. The 
results suggest that the average seller may be able to fetch a higher price (about three to four 
percent) for the house if she furnishes a state-mandated seller’s Property Condition Disclosure 
statement to the buyer. The state-mandated disclosure requirement ensures widespread 
compliance. The plausible reasons behind this premium could be the buyer’s greater confidence 
in the quality of the house she is acquiring, and the higher quality of the houses up for sale. The 
Property Condition Disclosure Law brings about the much-desired transparency in housing 
transactions, which increases the prospective homeowners’ confidence. The finding is consistent 
with the generally held postulate by real estate agents and scholars about the favorable impact of 
the law on average house prices.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 
Disclosure Mandate 
 
No Disclosure Mandate 
 
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
           291 Metropolitan Statistical Areas Characteristics: 1984Q1—2004Q4:  24,444 Observations 
 
%Change in HPI16 
 
17,189 
 
 
1.127 
 
 
2.186 
 
 
4,615 
 
 
1.012 
 
 
2.046 
 
 %Unemployment Rate 
 
 
19,068 
 
 
8.660 
 
 
9.227 
 
 
5,376 
 
 
10.254 
 
 
15.976 
 
 %Job Growth Rate 
 
 
19,068 
 
 
0.443 
 
 
4.081 
 
 
5,376 
 
 
0.556 
 
 
2.352 
 
 %Per Capita Income Change 
 
 
19,068 
 
 
5.619 
 
 
3.103 
 
 
5,376 
 
 
6.207 
 
 
2.943 
 
 %Per Capita GMP Growth 
Rate 
 
19,068 
 
 
1.142 
 
 
0.741 
 
 
5,376 
 
 
1.128 
 
 
0.657 
 
 %Population Growth Rate 
 
 
19,068 
 
 
0.292 
 
 
0.387 
 
 
5,376 
 
 
0.373 
 
 
0.412 
 
 
50   States Characteristics: 1984—2004: 1,050 Observations 
 
%Change in HPI 
 
714 
 
1.225 
 
1.299 
 
336 
 
1.059 
 
0.937 
 
%Unemployment Rate 
 
714 5.532 
 
 
1.682 
 
 
336 5.583 
 
 
1.875 
 
 %Job Growth Rate 
 
714 1.536 
 
 
1.891 
 
 
336 1.622 
 
 
1.983 
 
 %Per Capita Income Change 
 
714 1.391 
 
 
0.644 
 
 
336 1.416 
 
 
0.774 
 
 %Per Capita GSP Growth Rate 
 
714 4.861 
 
 
3.434 
 
 
336 4.766 
 
 
3.163 
 
 %Population Growth Rate 
 
714 1.058 
 
 
1.093 
 
 
336 0.979 
 
 
1.185 
 
 %Mortgage Rate 
 
714 8.432 
 
 
1.784 
 
 
336 8.434 
 
 
1.773 
 
 Number of Real Estate  
Licensees/1000 population 
714 6.144 
 
 
2.810 
 
 
336 5.991 
 
 
4.511 
 
 No. of Complaints 
 
714 860.112 
 
 
1465.934 
 
 
336 737.382 
 
 
2465.497 
 
 No. of Disciplinary Actions  
 
714 134.243 
 
 
267.121 
 
 
336 50.767 
 
 
53.126 
 
 Licensee  
Supervision Index 
714 47.555 
 
 
26.202 
 
 
336 50.529 
 
 
25.585 
 
 Democratic Control 
Democratic Governor 
714 0.225 
 
 
0.418 
 
 
336 0.277 
 
 
0.448 
 
 Democratic Control 
Republican Governor 
714 0.224 
 
 
0.417 
 
 
336 0.241 
 
 
0.428 
 
 Republican Control 
Republican Governor 
714 0.293 
 
 
0.455 
 
 
336 0.259 
 
 
0.438 
 
 Republican Control 
Democratic Governor 
714 0.258 
 
0.437 
 
336 0.223 
 
0.417 
 
                                                 
16
 The number of observations differs for HPI due to missing information for some MSAs in early 
years. 
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Table 2 Parametric Event Study: Fixed Effect Analysis at the MSA Level 
(Dependent Variable: Percent Change in HPI from previous quarter) 
Regressors 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Law Adoption 
 
 
0.251* 
(0.056) 
 
0.196* 
(0.057) 
 
0.167* 
(0.054) 
 
Mortgage Rate 
 
 
0.327* 
(0.112) 
 
0.751* 
(0.130) 
 
0.758* 
(0.131) 
 
%Unemployment 
 
 
-0.009* 
(0.003) 
 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
 
%Job Growth 
 
 
0.003 
(0.006) 
 
0.003 
(0.006) 
 
0.003 
(0.006) 
 
%Per Capita Income 
Change 
 
0.073* 
(0.011) 
 
0.077* 
(0.011) 
 
0.081* 
(0.011) 
 
%Per Capita GMP Growth 
Rate 
 
0.115* 
(0.039) 
 
0.082** 
(0.040) 
 
0.081** 
(0.039) 
 
%Population Growth Rate 
 
 
0.611* 
(0.096) 
 
0.782* 
(0.092) 
 
1.351* 
(0.112) 
 
Democratic Control 
Democratic Governor 
 
0.051 
(0.064) 
 
0.241* 
(0.069) 
 
0.221* 
(0.069) 
 
Republican Control 
Republican Governor 
 
-0.029 
(0.054) 
 
0.084 
(0.061) 
 
0.101 
(0.060) 
 
Democratic Control 
Republican Governor 
 
-0.073 
(0.052) 
 
0.018 
(0.071) 
 
-0.011 
(0.070) 
 
Number of Real Estate  
Licensees/1000 population 
 
0.009 
(0.007) 
 
-0.042* 
(0.016) 
 
-0.044* 
(0.017) 
 
% Disciplinary Action taken 
/ number of complaints 
 
-0.062 
(0.061) 
 
0.076 
(0.088) 
 
0.073 
(0.088) 
 
Licensee  
Supervision Index 
 
-0.008* 
(0.001) 
 
-0.009* 
(0.002) 
 
-0.009* 
(0.002) 
 
 Fixed Effects Time Only Time & State Time & MSA 
Joint Significance 
of Time Effects 
 
F (83, 290) =36.95 
(Pr= 0.00) 
 
F (83, 290)  
= 36.67 
(Pr= 0.00) 
 
F (83, 290) 
 = 35.69 
(Pr= 0.00) 
 Joint Significance 
of Cross-Section Effects 
 
 
F (48, 290) = 
20.72 
(Pr= 0.00) 
F (60, 290) 
=88236.11 
(Pr= 0.00) 
Adj. R2 
 
0.107 
 
0.128 
 
0.143 
 
N 
 
19,994 
 
19,994 
 
19,944 
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Table 3 Parametric: Feasible GLS Procedure: MSA 
(Dependent Variable: Percent Change in HPI from previous quarter) 
Regressors 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
Law Adoption 
 
 
0.184 
(0.116) 
 
0.191** 
(0.082) 
 
0.167** 
(0.080) 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
 
 
Time & 
MSA 
 
Time & 
MSA 
 
Time & 
MSA 
 
Panel 
Heteroscedasticity 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Error Structure 
 
 
No AR 
 
 
 
Same 
AR(1) 
Across Panels 
 
Panel Specific 
AR(1) 
 
 
N 19,491 19,491 19,490 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Semi-Parametric Event Study: Average Treatment Effect 
Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
Kernel Matching Estimators 
 
 
(1) 
Average Difference 
 
 
 
(2) 
Average Difference 
Year FE 
 
 
(3) 
DID-Benchmark 
 
 
 
Treatment Effect 0.099* 
(0.038) 
 
 
0.206* 
(0.033) 
 
 
0.219* 
(0.079) 
 
 
 
   
NOTES: Treatment is the law adoption. Outcome is the percent change in average quarterly HPI from the 
previous year to current year (year-over-year change). Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ imply 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance level.  
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Table 5 An Improvised Event Study of the Adoption of Disclosure Law 
Event Date/ 
Quarter 
 
Abnormal Return 
(AR) 
 
Positive ARs 
% 
 
33-Quarter 
CAR 
 
25-Quarter 
CAR 
 
17-Quarter 
CAR 
 
9-Quarter 
CAR 
 
-16 
 
0.606* 
(0.251) 
 
52 
 
0.606 
    
-15 
 
-0.111 
(0.309) 
 
44 
 
0.495 
    
-14 
 
0.047 
(0.285) 
 
54 
 
0.542 
    
-13 
 
0.525** 
(0.273) 
 
52 
 
1.067 
    
-12 
 
-0.046 
(0.250) 
 
42 
 
1.021 
 
-0.046 
   
-11 
 
0.090 
(0.199) 
 
51 
 
1.111 
 
0.044 
   
-10 
 
-0.049 
(0.201) 
 
50 
 
1.062 
 
-0.005 
   
-9 
 
0.182 
(0.178) 
 
52 
 
1.244 
 
0.177 
   
-8 
 
0.367*** 
(0.207) 
 
55 
 
1.611 
 
0.544 
 
0.367 
  
-7 
 
-0.255 
(0.165) 
 
43 
 
1.356 
 
0.289 
 
0.112 
  
-6 
 
0.095 
(0.167) 
 
51 
 
1.451 
 
0.384 
 
0.207 
  
-5 
 
-0.225 
(0.167) 
 
43 
 
1.226 
 
0.159 
 
-0.018 
  
-4 
 
-0.118 
(0.170) 
 
48 
 
1.108 
 
0.041 
 
-0.135 
 
-0.118 
 
-3 
 
0.255 
(0.163) 
 
52 
 
1.363 
 
0.296 
 
0.119 
 
0.137 
 
-2 
 
0.007 
(0.161) 
 
43 
 
1.370 
 
0.303 
 
0.126 
 
0.144 
 
-1 
 
-0.279 
(0.163) 
 
46 
 
1.090 
 
0.023 
 
-0.153 
 
-0.136 
 
0 
 
0.256** 
(0.141) 
 
50 
 
 
1.346 
 
0.279 
 
0.103 
 
0.120 
 
1 
 
0.053 
(0.126) 
 
46 
 
1.401 
 
0.333 
 
0.156 
 
0.174 
 
2 
 
-0.271 
(0.153) 
 
44 
 
1.128 
 
 
0.061 
 
-0.115 
 
-0.098 
 
3 
 
-0.101 
(0.178) 
 
46 
 
1.029 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.215 
 
-0.197 
 
4 
 
-0.140 
(0.178) 
 
44 
 
0.888 
 
-0.179 
 
-0.355 
 
-0.338 
 
5 
 
0.164 
(0.159) 
 
52 
 
1.052 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.192 
  
6 
 
-0.008 
(0.149) 
 
49 
 
1.044 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.199 
  
7 
 
0.390* 
(0.157) 
 
57 
 
1.434 
 
0.367 
 
0.191 
  
8 
 
0.111 
(0.131) 
 
50 
 
1.545 
 
0.478 
 
0.302 
  
9 
 
0.001 
(0.156) 
 
50 
 
1.545 
 
0.478 
   
10 
 
0.224*** 
(0.135) 
 
60 
 
1.769 
 
0.702 
   
11 
 
0.028 
(0.140) 
 
48 
 
1.797 
 
0.730 
   
12 
 
-0.044 
(0.127) 
 
49 
 
1.753 
 
0.686 
   
13 
 
0.240*** 
(0.141) 
 
50 
 
1.993 
 
 
   
14 
 
0.352* 
(0.119) 
 
55 
 
2.345 
    
15 
 
-0.132 
(0.126) 
 
47 
 
2.213 
    
 32
16 
 
0.086 
(0.134) 
 
57 
 
2.299 
    
 
